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In light of the theory of Special Relativity is a Passage of Time and the argument of the 
Presentist untenable?
Abstract 
In light of the Special Theory of Relativity and the Minkowski creation of ‘spacetime’, the 
universe is taken to be a four-dimensional entity which postulates bodies as existing within a 
temporally extended reality. The Special Theory of Relativity’s implications liken the nature of the 
universe to a ‘block’ within which all events coexist equally in spacetime. Such a view strikes 
against the very essence of presentism, which holds that all that exists is the instantaneous state 
of objects in the present moment. With respect to the present moment, events have a clear division 
into the past or future, however such regions do not exist in reality and the universe is a three-
dimensional entity. The consequences of a four-dimensional universe are disturbing to say the 
least for our everyday human experience, with once objective facts about reality becoming 
dependent upon an observer’s relative motion and the debate over the extent of true free will in a 
Block Universe. This paper will look at arguments which seek to rescue the presentist view in light 
of Special Relativity so such four-dimensionalist implications do not have to be accepted. Two 
approaches will be considered. The first accepts that presentism is incompatible with Special 
Relativity, and seeks to show that the theory is ultimately false.  The second holds that it is the 
Block Universe interpretation of Special Relativity that is wrong, and a version of presentism can 
be reconciled with Special Relativity. The paper will expound and critically examine both of these 
approaches to review whether the case for the three-dimensionalist and a fundamental passage of 
time can be made.
Introduction: Thoughts on Time and Motivations for Presentism
‘To us believing physicists the distinction between past, present and future has only the 
significance of a stubborn illusion.’ Einstein
The presentism vs. eternalism debate has been anticipated by earlier thoughts regarding the 
nature time, predating the Ancient Greek Philosophers, entering the realm of Philosophy of Physics 
in the debate between Newton and Leibniz over the absolute or relative character of time and 
transitioning into modern day philosophy with McTaggart’s (1908) A  vs. B theory of time. This 
paper will examine the impact that Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity (SR) has had on our 
understanding of time and whether, as a result of the theory, we are compelled to accept 
eternalism.
According to the traditional presentist view, events can be unambiguously classified as past, 
present or future depending on their relation with the present moment. The universe is three 
dimensional and not four dimensional, with all that exists in reality being the spatially extended set 
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of objects in the present instant. ‘If the world is three-dimensional it exists only at one moment of 
time and visa versa’ (Petkov 2005 p.1). The pervasive passage of time, alongside an open future 
and decided past, is a fundamental part of our human experience and allows us to construct a 
framework within which to understand and characterise reality. It provides us with a background 
upon which we can conduct scientific enquiry and it is the ontological openness of the future that 
makes free will, in its fullest sense, possible. 
Fig 1. Taken from Petkov (2005). An illustration of the presentist view - the universe is three-dimensional it is 
only the present moment ‘now’ that exists. 
The theory of relativity and its popular interpretation of a four-dimensional universe rejects the 
existence of an absolute passage of time and implies eternalism over presentism. The popular 
Minkowski interpretation of the theory denies the existence of a privileged time and proposes that 
the universe is four-dimensional continuum within which all events can be assigned coordinates 
x,y,z,t. As a result, the universe can be viewed as a ‘block’ in which all events exist on an 
ontologically equal footing as proposed by eternalism, with time as much a dimension of the 
universe as the three of space. 
The three dimensional vs. four dimensional universe debate can be reformulated in terms of 
eventism versus objectism as described by Maxwell. ‘According to objectism, the world is three 
dimensional and not four dimensional. The basic entities are spread out in space, but not in 
time.’ (Maxwell 1985 p.29) Objectism postulates a fundamental difference between space and time 
where ‘spatial relations are between objects’ and ‘temporal relations are between facts-about-
objects.’ (1985 p.29) Eventism, is the opposing view that reflects the premises of the Block 
Universe, in which ‘the world is spread out in both space and time. The basic entities are four-
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dimensional events, not three-dimensional objects’ and spacetime is an entity in reality rather than 
a tool to depict facts regarding the history of objects.
Maxwell (1985 p.25) also defines two affiliated types of probabilism, ‘ontological 
probabilism’ which views the future as open and having numerous ‘ontologically real alternative 
possibilities’ and ‘predictive probabilism’ which ‘asserts the future is in reality fixed and decided’  
even though what exists at one instant plus the basic laws makes only probabilistic predictions 
about future states of affairs. Predictive probabilism views the world as spread out in four-
dimensional Minkowskian space-time whilst ontological probabilism views the future as having 
alternative possibilities (which do not pre-exist in reality) and as time progresses these possibilities 
cease to exist as the present state is realised.
The traditional presentist, objectist and ontological probabilistic views are all inherently 
incompatible with SR, given its four-dimensional Minkowski interpretation, as they require a 
universal distinction between events which have already been realised and those which are yet to 
be, by a cosmic ‘now’. These views allow for free will in its most ‘full-blooded’ (Maxwell 1993 p.344) 
form where our actions are not fixed or in any way pre-determined as they are in the theories of the 
eternalist, eventist or predictive probabilist. Although slightly tongue in cheek, Yourgrau condemns 
the four-dimensional Block Universe in ‘A World Without Time’ (2005 p.123) when declaring ‘one 
need only recognise the befuddlement that would ensue if one were to try and act on the 
assumption that today’s breakfast is no more actual than yesterday’s or tomorrow’s, that the future, 
like the present, has already arrived… Should I still be wondering what to order for breakfast 
yesterday, as I am for tomorrow, or should I cancel both orders because the meals have already 
arrived?’
It is obvious, I hope, why one would want to seek arguments to rescue the presentist view, in 
light of such implications of the theory. In this paper I will present arguments which seek to 
counteract the views of the eternalist, which are supported by the Minkowski interpretation of SR 
and analyse whether the presentist view can be regarded as tenable. The implications of SR 
profoundly impact issues at the very heart of what it means to be human and our understanding of 
reality. As such, philosophical considerations of the theory’s implications are not only imperative 
but natural and it is through this synthesis of disciplines that we can obtain a deeper insight into the 
nature of time in our universe. 
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Literature Review: The Special Theory of Relativity
‘The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling 
upward alone the life line of my body, does a section of this world come to life as a fleeting image 
in space which continuously changes in time.’  (Weyl 1949 p.116)
Einstein’s relativity drastically changed popular scientific thought on the nature of time. Prior to 
relativity the best physical theories were Newton’s classical mechanics and Maxwell’s 
electrodynamics, in which time was regarded as absolute and ‘independent of the position and the 
condition of motion of the body of reference.’ (Einstein, 1988, p.30) Einstein’s motivations for SR 
came from the apparent inconsistency between the principle of relativity and law of propagation of 
light. The principle of relativity states that if any frame of reference K is Galilean, any frame of 
reference K’ which is related to K by a uniform motion of translation, will also be Galilean. Relative 
to K’ the laws of motion should hold exactly as they do relative to K. Therefore, ‘natural phenomena 
run their course with respect to K’ according to exactly the same general laws as with respect to K.’ 
(Einstein, 1988, p.13) The embodiment of the idea of an absolute reference frame would be a 
frame K0 in which the ‘natural laws are capable of being formulated in a particularly simple manner’ 
and hence we should ‘be justified in calling this system “absolutely at rest” and all other Galilean 
frames K “in motion”.’ (Einstein, 1988 p.14) However, according to the principle of relativity each 
frame has as good a claim to be at rest as any other.
This leads to the apparent incompatibility of the law of light propagation with the principle of 
relativity. The velocity of the speed of light c was a fixed constant as a consequence of Maxwell’s 
equations, hence it must have the same velocity in all Galilean reference frames, as again, ‘natural 
phenomena run their course with respect to K’ according to exactly the same general laws as with 
respect to K’. (Einstein, 1988, p.13) However the original Galilean transformations propose the 
addition of velocities, such that the overall velocity of light would be dependent on the velocity of its 
source (regardless of whether the light relative to the source remained fixed at c). It was by uniting 
these two seemingly incompatible principles that Einstein arrived at his Special Theory of 
Relativity.
To go from one reference frame to another ‘relations must be so chosen that the law of the 
transmission of light in vacuo is satisfied for one and the same ray of light with respect to K and K’.’  
(Einstein, 1988, p.32) Such relations are named Lorentz transformations. Through these Einstein 
shed the assumption of the absolute character of time and distance (and consequently any case 
for an ether) with the phenomena of time dilation and length contraction. It is unclear whether 
Einstein knew about the null result of Michelson Morley experiment in detecting the ether or 
whether he just assumed the ether did not exist when deriving his Lorentz transformations of SR. 
Regardless, ‘the role of the Michelson experiment in the genesis of Einstein’s theory appears to 
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have been so small and indirect that one may speculate that it would have made no difference to 
Einstein’s work if the experiment had never been made at all.’  (Holton, 1969, p.195)
The Lorentz transformations: Where x’,y’,z’,t’ are taken as the coordinates in the K’ frame, and x,y,z,t the 
coordinates in the K frame. The axes of K and K’ are parallel and K’ moves along the x-axis of K
The principle of relativity and Lorentz transformations abolish the notion of an absolute time 
through the phenomenon of the relativity of simultaneity. This phenomenon is the key step in 
overthrowing the concept of an absolute time and presentism. Presentism requires that any two 
spatially separated events are unambiguously either simultaneous,  or that one is objectively 
earlier than the other. Whilst the relativity of simultaneity states that two events could be said to be 
simultaneous for one observer and have a temporal separation as measured by another observer. 
From the Lorentz transformations above we can see that 𝛿t between two events in one system of 
coordinates can be zero (the events are simultaneous) whilst in another set of coordinates, 𝛿t’ can 
assume any positive value (the events are non-simultaneous). Einstein therefore concludes, ‘every 
reference-body has its own particular time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the 
statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event.’ (Einstein, 
1988, p.26) 
Einstein’s original ideas in his paper ‘On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’ (1905) were 
inherently related to measurements, the workings of rods and clocks. This is evident when he 
states in chapter XII ‘Rods and Clocks in Motion’ ‘it is quite clear that we must be able to learn 
something about the physical behaviour of measuring rods and clocks from the equations of 
transformation, for the magnitudes x,y,z,t are nothing more nor less than the results of 
measurements obtainable by means of measuring-rods and clocks.’ (1988 p.36) As Maxwell 
(1985 p.30) highlights, ‘Einstein originally formulated special relativity in such a way that objectism 
is presupposed’ with reference frames being characterised in terms of rods and clocks, persisting 
objects’ a view compatible with a three-dimensional universe.
However, in the Minkowskian view put forward in 1908, the world of physical phenomena exist 
in four-dimensions, in a structure known as ‘space-time’. Four numbers can be ascribed to every 
event, ‘three space co-ordinates x,y,z and a time co-ordinate, the time value t’ (Einstein, 1988 p. 
55) and objects trace out curves, or ‘worldlines’ over time (Einstein, 1988 p.56). Minkowski’s radical 
contribution was his reformulation of the time coordinate t to ict. Through this mathematical 
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manipulation, the time coordinate is given the same ‘role’ or ontology as the three space 
coordinates, it is due to this fact that, according to the theory of relativity, the ‘time’ x4 enters into 
natural laws in the same form as the space co-ordinates x1,x2,x3.
A strong similarity with Euclidean three-dimensional geometry is then created. Distances in these 
four-dimensions, known as spacetime intervals, are always preserved regardless of the observer’s 
chosen frame of reference, as conventional distances on rigid bodies are in three dimensional 
Euclidian geometry. This relationship is given by:
Where x’,y’,z’,t represent a different frame of reference from x,y,z,t.
Minkowski then uses the four-dimensional geometry, replacing t with ict, to create a relativistic 
temporal structure through the construction of a light cone. The past light cone with t < 0 and future 
light cone with t > 0.
Fig 3. A Light Cone, given by the equation stated above, suppressed in one spatial dimension.
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Given an event a, existing at Here-Now and the classification of another event b is as follows:
1. b is in the past light cone of a ( b < a ), b is fixed and realised
    the vector from a to b is past-oriented timelike vector
2. b is in the future light cone of a ( a < b ), b is not realised
the vector from a to b is a future-oriented timelike vector
Temporal structure therefore clearly still exists for time-like separated events. Events do not 
have an exact and absolute ontological separation of space and time but overall causality is 
preserved and observer independent temporal facts about reality can be given across all reference 
frames. Such a structure cannot be held if a and b are space-like separated events.
3. b is in the casual elsewhere of a that is, b lies outside both the past and future light cones of a 
and whether b is realised or not cannot be objectively determined
the vector from a to b is space-like vector
In this case the temporal ordering of spatially separated events is purely dependent on the 
observer’s frame of references and any t coordinate values can be given such that one may be 
earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than, the other. ‘Any world-point between the front and 
back cones of O can be arranged by means of the system of reference so as to be simultaneous 
with O, but also just as well so as to be earlier than O or later than O.’ (Minkowski 1908 p.84) This 
lack of agreement in simultaneity is precisely what undermines the presentist due to their 
requirement for an unambiguous cosmic now. 
Minkowski’s 1908 address opens with the famous remark ‘henceforth space by itself, and time 
by, itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will 
preserve an independent reality’. (Minkowski, 1952, p.75) However despite giving aesthetic 
reasoning in favour of spacetime, ‘it is only in four dimensions that the relations here taken under 
consideration reveal their inner being in full simplicity, and that on a three dimensional space 
forced upon us a priori they cast only a very complicated projection’ (Minkowski, 1952, p.90) he 
does not give an explicit argument that SR must be or can only be interpreted in the spacetime 
way. And thus, Minkowski does not himself explicitly formulate the argument that SR implies 
presentism is false. There exists a big difference between a formulation being a possibility and an 
obligatory stance given the theory, and it seems Minkowski’s account four-dimensionalist 
spacetime comes away as merely a very attractive and convincing way of interpreting SR, which 
upholds the nature of the theory and is one a mathematician or theoretical physicist would find 
hard to resist. 
Whilst the Minkowski interpretation of SR proposes that the universe should be seen as a four-
dimensional entity, within which all spacetime events exist equally, philosophers Rietdijk and 
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Putnam attempt to clarify explicitly why the ‘Block Universe’ is the logical conclusion from the 
principles of the theory. Their arguments use spacetime diagrams to compare events across 
different observer reference frames, from which ‘a proof is given that there does not exist an event, 
that is not already in the past for some possible distant observer at the moment that the latter is 
"now" for us.’ (Rietdijk 1966 p.1). As such, the papers seek to show the Minkowskian view of the 
universe stands true, given SR. A similar approach employing spacetime diagrams is presented 
below. However Gödel, significantly earlier in 1949, gives an argument for the four-dimensional 
universe as a result of SR and later this is supported in GR with his introduction of Closed Timelike 
Curves. This argument is presented in a subsequent section.
Fig 2. Spacetime Diagram of three inertial observers X,X’,X’’ and their respective axes and planes of 
simultaneity (indicated by dashed lines). 
The diagram is a spacetime visualisation of three observers: X, X’, X’’. Each has their own time 
and space axis and planes of simultaneity represented (dashed lines). If two events lie along a 
certain observer’s plane of simultaneity, they are considered simultaneous in that observer’s 
reference frame. The present for an observer in the framework of relativity is taken here to be 
comprised of events considered simultaneous in their frame of reference, an adaptation known as 
relativised presentism. The observer X, whose frame is considered at rest, is shown in black. For X 
the common event, indicated by the yellow star (*) is simultaneous with black star event (B) at what 
X measures to be t=1. For observer X’, travelling at speed v relative to X, event * is simultaneous 
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with the blue star event (C). For observer X’’, travelling at speed v in the opposite direction to X’,
event * is simultaneous with the red star event (A). 
Comparing these on X’s time axes we can see the C has a lower time coordinate value than B 
and hence can be said to be in the past for X when he is at t=1. A has a higher time coordinate 
than B and hence can be said to be in the future for X at t=1. At event * which is common to all 
observers, X is justified in saying B currently exists, X’ is justified in saying C currently exists, X’’ is 
justified in saying A currently exists. From this formulation, where all inertial frames are considered 
equivalent in their justification, all events can be said to be equally real.
It is logical to see how this set-up can be expanded to include all points in space and time, 
ultimately creating the idea of a Block Universe. If B and * were separated on an astronomical 
distance scale, the planes of simultaneity of X’ and X’’ that include * would extend their intersection 
with the t axis of X to higher and lower values of t. In theory, if B and * were separated far enough, 
the intersections would occur at t = ∞ and t = -∞ for X. Moreover, if the speed of X’ and X’’ was 
comparable to the speed of the light, their corresponding axes relative to X would be appear much 
more condensed, (closer to the 45 degree line) with steeper planes of simultaneity again 
intersecting further back and forward on the t axis of X. Rietdijk (1966 p.343) on this argument 
states ‘every event is pre-determined from time immemorial’. Moreover, according to Dainton (2001 
p.9) ‘If the block universe is true, the view that the future is open is wrong, for the future is just as 
real, solid and immutable as the past. How our lives will unfold from now until the moment of our 
death is already laid down…the choices that we will make are inscribed in the fabric of reality in 
precisely the same way as choices that we already have made.’ I hope these unsettling quotes are 
convincing enough to remind the reader of the motivations to attempt to rescue the presentist view.
Arguments: Efforts to rescue Presentism
In the light of the theory of relativity there are two distinct approaches that can be taken in 
the attempt to rescue presentism. There are those that state presentism is not compatible with SR 
but hold that SR is ultimately false along with its eternalist implications. Arguments of this type that 
will be examined are; evidence from General Relativity (GR) for an absolute time and possibilities 
of unified theories of quantum gravity disproving eternalist claims. Secondly there are those that 
state presentism or at least a form of becoming can be compatible with relativity. They seek to do 
this by incorporating presentism into SR by various means. Either the four dimensional framework 
is unnecessary to explain physical phenomenon, as proposed by the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation, 
or the assumptions behind the Block Universe are wrong as put forward by Stein’s ‘point 
presentism’ and Dingle’s comments on time vs the time. Each of these arguments shall be 
presented and critically expounded. To begin with we shall look at possible evidence from GR for a 
preferred reference frame and hence absolute time. 
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1) Evidence from General Relativity for an Absolute Time
Special Relativity is, as its name indicates, special as it is only valid in inertial frames 
moving with constant velocity with respect to each other. GR, is the parent theory within which 
subsystems of flat space can be modelled by SR. Although in SR there are no frames of reference 
that can be considered privileged, in the general theory there are situations in which there may be. 
Such frames could then be coordinated so that they determine an absolute time, a ‘cosmic time’. 
The problem faced by the presentist is a justification of on what grounds a metaphysically preferred 
reference frame can be chosen. Smolin claims this justification can be found on the astronomical 
scale as ‘the universe is arranged in such a way that it picks out a preferred state of rest… the 
motions of galaxies pick out a preferred observer, hence a preferred state of rest at each point in 
space.’ (Smolin 2014 p.166)  
According to the mathematician logician Gödel, time could regain its objective existence on 
this astronomical state as ‘the existence of matter, as well as the particular kind of curvature of 
space-time produced by it, largely destroy the equivalence of different observers and distinguish 
some of them conspicuously form the rest, namely those which follow in their notion of the mean 
motion of matter’ (Gödel 1949, p.559) On the local scale we have no detection of this and the 
principles of SR apply with sufficient accuracy. 
Cosmologists also look towards the distribution of Cosmic Microwave Background 
Radiation (CMBR) for search of a privileged reference frame.  ‘The cosmic microwave background 
radiation fills all of space and is remarkably isotropic for any observer at rest with respect to the 
expansion of space. The radiation background will be anisotropic for any observer in motion with 
respect to an observer whose spatial coordinates remain fixed. It therefore acts as a sort of aether, 
serving to distinguish physically a fundamental universal reference frame.’ (Time and the 
Metaphysics of Relativity, Craig p.220) By an observer whose spatial coordinates remain fixed, it is 
meant an observer for whom the radiation is isotropic, and who thus may be regarded as 
motionless. Moreover, in models of GR there are seen to be preferred foliations of spacetime, 
preferred geometrical slicings. For example in Schwarzschild spacetime, one natural slicing gives a 
space whose geometric properties remain constant over time, whilst in the Robertson-Walker 
spacetime, ‘one slicing gives spaces filled with homogenous matter distributions’. (Norton 2000 p.
6) According to Savitt (2000 p.S572) ‘the presentist should throw in the towel with respect to SR, 
but need not admit defeat, for there is GR and beyond yet to be examined.’
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Criticisms of an Absolute Time from General Relativity
There are criticisms over whether moving to the cosmos as a whole provides a sufficient 
basis for regarding one frame a privileged. Firstly, why exactly should a frame be privileged if it 
follows the mean motion of matter? Suppose there are N reference frames, in an otherwise empty 
space, all in relative motion, consisting of equally massive rods and clocks. If one of these frames 
is taken and progressively increased so its mass is far greater than the rest combined why should 
that make it in any sense privileged? Why should the contingent state of affairs, in this case the 
average local motion of matter, have consequences for the nature of basic physical laws in the 
universe? Furthermore, symmetry features inherent in SR face problems with this approach. SR 
states that if Frame 1 and 2 are inertially related, if F1 measures a contraction in F2 then F2 will 
measure that same contraction in F1. If F1 is then taking to be at rest with the mean motion of 
matter or the CMBR but these symmetry observations still hold, does this not suffice to refute the 
idea that F1 is somehow privileged within the framework of SR? Secondly, curved spacetime is 
required to reduce to flat Minkowski space on all local scales. Therefore as GR collapses in all 
cases to SR and seeing as SR, if interpreted in the Minkowskian sense, violates presentism locally 
should these problems not then automatically be retained when scaling up to the domain of GR? It 
seems the problems for the presentist from SR would continue to be relevant, as GR retains SR as 
a limiting case theory. 
Thirdly it could be argued that, if anything, GR is more committed to the spacetime view 
than SR and the Minkowski interpretation becomes more solidified when moving to GR. Einstein 
needed the spacetime view in order to formulate GR and make sense of the curvature existing in 
space and time. Moreover in features of GR such as Black Holes, space and time intertwine at the 
horizon and beyond with once spacelike vectors becoming timelike in the formulation. However, 
the most devastating blow to the presentist from GR comes from Gödel’s 1949 paper on the 
possibility of Closed Timelike Curves (CTCs) in the context of rotating universes. Gödel (1949 p.
560) states, ‘there exist cosmological solutions of another kind than those known at present, to 
which the aforementioned procedure of defining an absolute time is not applicable, because the 
local times of the special observers used above cannot be fitted together into one world time.’ In 
worlds such as these ‘making a round trip in a rocket ship in a sufficiently wide curve, it is possible 
to travel into any region of the past, present and future and back again, exactly as it is possible in 
other worlds to travel to distant parts of space.’ (Gödel, 1949 p.560) Although CTCs are features of 
unrealistic situations (i.e. rotating universes) and have not been proven to exist in our world 
nevertheless Gödel’s findings still have implications for what GR says about our world. Even if 
CTCs only exist in universes different from ours they remain a feature of GR and therefore have 
implications for what GR says about the nature of our universe. CTCs as a feature of GR are 
inherently incompatible with presentism and heavily support the Block Universe. If the Block 
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Universe is supported in a possible universe predicted by GR, it is implied in all possible worlds in 
which GR holds. Changing the contingent states of affairs to which a theory apples does not 
change the theory and from these results it seems it must be concluded that GR also implies 
presentism is false. 
2) The NeoLorentzian Approach: The Claim for a Metaphysically Preferred Reference Frame
Arguments of the second type shall now be turned to, those which propose that presentism or 
a notion of becoming is compatible with SR. The most popular of these being the Neo-Lorentzian 
(NL) interpretation of the theory most notably advocated by Craig (2001) in ‘Time and the 
Metaphysics of Relativity.’  Craig (2000 p.118) believes the Minkowski Interpretation (MI) is lacking 
explanation and ‘the Neo-Lorentzian will charge that a perspectival, four-dimensional approach to 
relativistic phenomena has resulted in the neglect of the search for the dynamic causes of time 
dilation and length contact, a major oversight’.  The NL interpretation puts forward a 3+1 
dimensional ontology of the world with the existence of an absolute time and privileged frame of 
reference, relative to which all other frames are considered in motion. Length contraction and time 
dilation occur for events measured in frames in motion relative to the privileged rest frame. 
Comparatively, in the MI objects exist in four dimensions, such that they are temporally extended 
and proper time and length measurements vary between reference frames with each frame equally 
justifiable in their claim to being ‘at rest’. Seeing as possible arguments for the existence of a 
privileged reference frame (hence an absolute time and rescue for the presentist) have been 
mentioned in this section of the paper, we will now examine the merits of the NL interpretation’s 
explanation of the phenomenon of length contraction and time dilation against that of the MI. 
In order to account for phenomena of length contraction, Lorentz and FitzGerald assumed ‘that 
the motion of the body relative to the aether produces a contraction of the body in the direction of 
motion.’ (Einstein, 1988, p.54) In this case the ether represents the privileged reference frame, 
which in turn would give an absolute time. Such postulations came in the wake of Michelson-
Morley experiment which attempted to detect the relative motion of matter with respect to the ether 
by comparing the speed of light in perpendicular directions. The experiment was met with a null 
result and thus required explanation to account for the failure to detect motion through the ether. 
Lorentz and FitzGerald put forward the conjecture that rods in motion through the ether contracted 
in accordance with the Lorentz transformation along the line of motion, relative to the rest frame. 
Such contractions were motivated by the contraction of electrostatic fields in the direction of motion 
as discovered in 1888, though at the time there was no reason to presume the forces between 
matter molecules were of a similar nature. As such, the explanation of contraction phenomenon in 
the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation are largely regarded as ad-hoc.
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Fig 4. Set up of the Michelson-Morley experiment. Beams of light sent to a half mirror where they are split 
into perpendicular directions before being recombined to detect an inference pattern. If an interference 
pattern were present this would confirm the difference in the speed of light due to relative motion with the 
ether.
The crucial difference between this explanation and that from SR as put forward by Einstein (1988, 
p.53) is that, in relativity ‘there is no such thing as a “specially favoured” coordinate system to 
occasion the introduction of the aether-idea…as the prime factor involved in this contraction we 
find is not the motion in itself, to which we cannot attach any meaning, but the motion with respect 
to the body of reference chosen in the particular case in point.’ However in the NL interpretation the 
measured time and length are special in the rest frame K0, these are the true proper values from 
which all other measurements are transformed. The Lorentz transformations form a group 
compatible with the principle of relativity which makes the existence of a privileged rest frame 
undetectable. The undetectable nature allows no for possible verification by experiment between 
the two interpretations.
The kinematic consequences of the theory can still be expressed in a 3D language and the 3D-
er does nowhere state that the privileged planes of simultaneity should be distinguishable, hence 
the 4D-er cannot use this as an argument against their case. It is consented that ‘the argument (for 
the MI) is not iron-clad and may still be outweighed by the needs of theology or quantum 
mechanics.’ (Balashov, Janseen 2003 p.25) Due to the unobservable differences between NL and 
MI, the argument to favour the MI for its simplicity of explanation is nothing more, according to 
Earman (1989 p.48), than ‘an objection based on Occam’s razor.’ Indeed, it could even be 
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suggested that if one is arguing on the grounds of simplicity the NL interpretation should be 
preferred to the MI, as the latter proposes the metaphysical existence of four-dimensions, which 
adds excessive ontological structure to a universe which could exist, in accordance with 
experimental proof, in three dimensions. 
Criticisms of The NeoLorentzian Approach
In the Minkowski Interpretation, length contraction is a product of the four-dimensional 
geometry, shown by ‘two observers who are in relative motion to one another and therefore use 
different sets of space-time axes and disagree about which cross-section of the ‘world-tube’ of a 
physical system gives the length of the system’ (Balashov, Janssen 2003 p.10). The way in which 
the MI explains the physical phenomenon is seen as mathematically elegant, arising naturally as a 
by-product of the geometry of the spacetime. The Lorentz transformations are derived by Einstein 
directly following from the principle of relativity, light postulate and isotropy of space. The NL 
however is regarded as highly ad-hoc in comparison by Janssen as ‘it is, in the final analysis, an 
unexplained coincidence that the laws effectively governing different sorts of matter all share the 
property of Lorentz invariance…In the space-time interpretation this coincidence is explained by 
tracing the Lorentz invariance of all these different laws to a common origin: the space-time 
structure posited in this interpretation.’ (Balashov, Janssen 2003 p.24) 
Fig 5. Taken from Petkov (2005) An illustration of the Minkowski interpretation of Length Contraction: The 
cross section L of a rod’s worldtube as seen by two observers A and B, in relative motion.
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It seems, that the NL interpretation cannot appeal to a hypothetical ether to provide explanations 
for the behaviour of rods and clocks in motion and do justice to the phenomenon successfully 
predicted by SR, namely symmetry. Given two rods, with one in relative motion to the other, which 
is considered stationary with the ether, how could the symmetrical effects of observed length 
contractions be explained when working from within each rod’s reference frame. This seems fatal 
to the Neo-Lorentzian theory. 
Moreover, the undetectable nature of the metaphysically privileged reference frame in the NL 
interpretation is a strength as well as a significant weakness. According to the distinguished 
philosopher of science Karl Popper, all scientific theories should be empirically falsifiable. Theories 
can never be proven, but they can be falsified. Sound scientific theories should allow experiments 
to analyse and make deductions on their strength and validity. Popper believes, if the results of the 
experiment go against the theory, one should refrain from manipulations that are ad hoc, which 
evade the contradictions by merely making them less falsifiable. This precise manoeuvre can be 
critiqued of the Lorentz-FitzGerald contractions following the Michelson-Morley experiment in the 
search for the ether. 
Finally, if the Neo-Lorentzian theory invokes exactly the same Lorentzian transformations as 
the original interpretation, what function does the rest frame play at all? It is treated as all other 
inertial frames. As Savitt (2000 p.S570) duly notes ‘this metaphysically distinguished present 
cannot, according to the relativity principle, be ascertained by any physical measurement or 
experiment. If the present is indeed so elusive, I find it difficult to imagine what aid or comfort it 
could be to a metaphysician.’ Savitt (2000 p.S570) views the Neo-Lorentzian approach as merely 
‘a strategy for rejecting special relativity in favour of presentism rather than accommodating 
presentism in Minkowski spacetime’ where the loss of a sound explanation of the physical 
phenomenon seems too high a price to pay for adding an undetectable rest frame to our ontology.  
To choose a metaphysically distinguished hyperplane to represent the present in this way is 
nothing more than ‘inertial chauvinism’. (Savitt 2000 p.S570) 
3) The Argument from the Anti-Realist regarding The Nature of Time
A different objection to the dismissal of an objective flow of time comes from the anti-realist. In 
SR from the relative measurements of time across different reference frames it is understood that 
time is relative in reality. However the anti-realist may argue that it is misguided to loose our belief 
in an absolute time as a result of the information we have obtained from our measurements alone. 
Such measurements may reflect our interpretation of time but not necessarily the way time really 
is. Dingle (1979) speaks of this differentiation and creates a distinction between what he calls the 
time, which is based on readings of measuring instruments in scientific enquiry (measured time) 
and experiential time itself (absolute time). When Minkowski famously ‘let t denote time’ Dingle 
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believes he falsely identified clock readings with the experience of time itself. This dramatically 
transformed Einstein’s theory, which worked with measurements alone, postulating that relatively 
moving clocks work at different rates, to a theory which seemed extremely incomprehensible and 
characterised fantastical phenomenon like ‘time-dilation’ as fundamental aspects of nature. 
Descriptions of intuitive time, according to Dingle, must be metaphorical whilst our scientific 
measurements are restricted to dealing with the temporal coordinate of the theory t.
On what grounds should we believe that if our scientific theories are experimentally successful 
that they reflect ‘truth’. Laudan (1981) in ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’ argues that the 
realist would like to say if a theory is successful it is approximately truth, however this is only an 
intuition and a connection between success and approximate truth must be argued for implicitly. 
‘The realist’s hunch that increasing deep-structural fidelity must manifest itself pragmatically in the 
form of heightened experimental accuracy has yet to be made cogent.’ (Laudan 1981 p.35) 
Therefore, according to the anti-realist why should our measurements of time, although accurate in 
representing the workings of clocks for relatively moving observers, necessarily reflect the true 
nature of reality. The instrumentalist approach instead would be to accept spacetime and four-
dimensional geometry as a convenient device for predictive purposes, but not accept the existence 
of such an entity in reality. Similarly, Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism proposes that 
accepting the best scientific theory only requires believing that it is empirically adequate in 
describing the observable world, but it does not have to be believed to be truth simpliciter. 
Criticisms of the Anti-Realist
The criticism of this time versus the time Dingle-type distinction can be summarised aptly by 
responses of the Realist. SR and GR are our best theories regarding the nature of time and thus 
we should take them and their implications seriously. The Realist would argue that if we do not 
take our successful theories to be approximately true and reflecting of the underlying nature of 
reality then the success of science becomes a miracle. (Putnam 1975)
It can also be argued that time is a human construct and thus all we postulate about the nature 
of time should be from our empirical deductions. Perhaps our ordinary experiences lead us to 
believe there exists a higher order time though there is not. Stein (1991 p.162) believes we have 
developed such illusionary intuitions of ‘cosmic simultaneity’ from our ordinary experiences in that 
‘the time that we experience as a specious present is in the exact sense already explained 
contemporaneous with events as far distant, spatially, as we ever normally have to do with at all.’  
Perhaps on distance scales as local as ours, at speeds far slower than the speed of light we share 
the experience of a common present, though this need not be the true nature of time.
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4) An Alternative form of Presentism in the context of Relativity Theory 
This argument seeks to reconcile a form of presentism with the Theory of Relativity. In the 
Rietdijk-Putnam style creation of the Block Universe we see two key assumptions. Firstly, the form 
presentism takes in a relativistic framework, which Hinchliff (1996 p.130) calls the ‘relativised 
present’. ‘In a relativistic setting, presentism is the view that the real events for an observer are the 
events simultaneous with the observer in the observer’s frame of reference’. The second 
assumption is the principle of transitivity that is, if x is real for y, then y is real for x. Together these 
assumptions states that: if an event X is real for observer A (simultaneous according to A’s 
reference frame), and observer A is real for us (simultaneous in our reference frame), then event X 
is real for us too (principle of transitivity). This then leads to the understanding that all events are 
equally real in the 4D universe. Hinchliff (1966 p.131) believes ‘the assumption of relativised 
presentism is one proposal about what the doctrine of presentism is in a relativistic setting, but it is 
not the only one, or even the most plausible one.’
An alternative form comes from Stein who instead believes a theory known as ‘point 
presentism’ is the correct description of presentism within relativity. According to Stein, in the 
framework of relativity, the only meaning of the present is that assigned to a ‘here-now’, at a 
spacetime point and ‘the only really simultaneous events are events which occur at the same 
place.’ (Robb, 1921, p.13) The entity from which the distinction of what events are definite or 
indefinite is made from the perspective of the ‘here-now’ as we have seen above in the geometric 
properties of the light cone. Event A could be said to be in the future of event B if and only if it was 
in the future light cone of B. Event C could be deemed to be in the past of event B if and only if it 
was in the past light cone of B. This casual structure is consistent across observers. ‘For an event - 
a spacetime point a, those events, and only those, that have already become real are those which 
occur at points in the topological closure of the past of a’ (Stein 1968 p.14)
For Stein, a notion of passage is restored through the perspective of the ‘here-now’ alone and 
temporal relations between timelike separated events. Thus SR accommodates a new form of 
relativistic becoming. The view does away with the eternalist perspective whilst respecting ‘the 
spatiotemporal symmetries of relativistic physics yet maintains there is more to time’s passage 
than the block universe picture permits.’
Criticisms of An Alternative form of Presentism
In adopting ‘point presentism’ we seem to lose much of the meaning the traditional present 
once held. If the present is reduced to a ‘here-now’ and only the event at which the observer is 
located is regarded as present (hence real and determined) suggests a strange form of ‘spatio-
temporal solipsism’. It seems ‘a little discomfiting to the presentist to restrict reality to just one point 
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of spacetime.’ (Savitt 2000 p. S568) This is somewhat counteracted by the claim that ‘each point of 
spacetime is present’ (with respect to itself) so equivalence is preserved but if then ‘no point of 
spacetime is metaphysically distinguished from any of the others with respect to 
presentness’ (Savitt 2000 p. S568) it seems the point-presentist argument completely disintegrates 
and reduces to eternalism once more. If all points are special, none are. By adopting ‘point-
presentism’ it could be argued that we manage to reconcile a form of relativistic becoming with SR 
but in doing so do we take away all the full-bloodedness from traditional presentist’s argument, 
such that it is unrecognisable as a presentist theory. There is no longer a universal present 
moment or a clear division between a fixed past and open future. As Savitt (2000 p.S569) 
summarises, ‘point-presentism’ may ‘be called presentism, but it fails to capture the fundamental 
metaphysical intuitions underlying presentism.’ The block universe interpretation of SR which relies 
on the two assumptions previously stated may be seen to be flawed in assuming these are the only 
options but is this enough to rescue the presentist? At most the foundations of the eternalist may 
be seen to be weakened but this does not mean we can say the presentist it correct. To do so we 
need to find a way to reconciling our metaphysical intuitions about the present with the physical 
theories. 
5) The Advancement of Scientific Theories and Probabilistic Quantum Gravity
The final argument believes presentism is irreconcilable with relativity theory but that 
Special and General Relativity are ultimately false. Newtonian theory and classical mechanics 
were once considered the most accurate theories of the physical world. However the theory of 
electromagnetism developed by James Clerk Maxwell had inconsistencies with Newtonian theory, 
namely over the speed of light. As such, SR was developed, highlighting Newtonian mechanics as 
only an approximation, valid in systems travelling much slower than the speed of light - a limiting 
case earlier theory. SR itself is nowhere perfectly instantiated and emerges as an approximation in 
systems of flat space from GR. What can be said of GR? A theory which could make more 
accurate predictions over a larger range of phenomenon, let it be called T, could falsify GR. As 
Nicholas Maxwell (2006 p.4) explains ‘almost always in the history of physics, when a new theory, 
T, unifies two predecessor theories, T1 and T2, T reveals that T1 and T2 are strictly speaking 
false.’ T in this case is likely to come in the form of a theory of quantum gravity, due to GR’s 
inherent conflict with quantum theories. However, SR and GR being false does not rescue the 
presentist as their eternalist implications must too be false in light of the advanced T. 
On what grounds can we currently seek falsification of the spacetime view and verification 
of the presentist? To do this we look towards Probabilism. Ontological probabilism as defined by 
Maxwell (1985) views the future as open and having numerous ‘ontologically real alternative 
possibilities’. This probabilistic view is inherently incompatible with SR and GR due to its 
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requirement for a universal present to distinguish between events that have already been realised 
and those which are yet to be. GR is a deterministic theory and if the laws of the universe were 
found to be probabilistic in this way, so that the future is open with many alternative possibilities, it 
would render SR and GR false and propose the need for a universal present. Of course, we cannot 
assume the laws are probabilistic in this way, but the fact that they could be and the fact that GR is 
likely to be falsified means we should not condemn all presentist theories which conflict with SR’s 
implications.
Orthodox quantum theory states quantum mechanics is deterministic with the evolution of 
the wave function governed via Schrödinger’s time-dependent equation. However when 
measurements are made in quantum mechanics, probabilistic events occur. As N. Maxwell (2015 
p.7) states, ‘failure to solve the quantum wave/particle problem also leads to the failure of orthodox 
quantum theory to answer unambiguously whether the quantum domain is deterministic or 
probabilistic.’ However, probabilistic changes of the quantum state imply instantaneous transitions, 
such as the phenomena of wave packet collapse and these probabilistic changes conflict directly 
with the relativity of simultaneity. Such a collapse would only be regarded instantaneous in one 
reference frame, that which is at rest with the wave function, and hence would pick out a unique, 
privileged frame whilst SR demands all inertial frames be seen as equivalent. If instantaneous 
probabilistic collapses of quantum states really do occur in nature - as they may do, for all we know 
at present - this would not only falsify deterministic GR. It would also provide grounds for picking 
out privileged reference frames - those with respect to which probabilistic collapses are 
instantaneous. 
Maxwell (2015 p.10) suggests such ‘probabilistic collapses of quantum states are all that 
there is in the constitution of things that picks out ‘the reference frame at rest’ and thus ‘the 
associated cosmic now’. This opposes the previous view that a privileged frame could be found in 
the analysis of universal matter distribution. Maxwell explains SR and GR could be good 
approximations in the deterministic evolution of macro states whilst having no way of determining 
the hyperplanes that constitute the rest frame. Yet the ‘quantum probabilistic transitions determine, 
physically, that frame uniquely at rest’, the ‘cosmic wide now’’. (Maxwell, 2015, p.11) Furthermore 
Stephen Hawking speculates that CTCs, which appear as certain solutions to GR and imply the 
Block-like Universe, may be done away with by quantum gravity in a conjecture labelled the 
chronology protection conjecture. 
The view of Scientific Realists is that theories advance to a truth and maintain their 
predecessors as limiting case approximations. As seen in the History of Science, theories have 
continually advanced and ‘just as Newton corrects Kepler and Galileo, and Einstein corrects 
Newton, so future theories will no doubt correct Einstein.’ (Maxwell 1985, p.29) A unification of GR 
and QM could produce a more advanced theory T. Moreover, if QM is interpreted probabilistically, T 
could take the form of probabilistic quantum gravity, whose implications rescue an absolute frame 
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of reference, in accordance with instantaneous probabilistic transitions, and thus act as a rescue 
for the presentist. 
Criticisms of Probabilistic Quantum Gravity rescuing Presentism
Although QM may provide grounds to rescue presentism, it is still very much a speculative
matter. The nature of wave function collapse is a highly controversial issue, with many physicists
advocating deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics such as the Bohm or Many Worlds
Interpretation in which the wave function goes off to realise all possibilities in
alternate, ever branching, universes. A unified theory of GR and QM therefore need not be
probabilistic but preserve determinism. Furthermore, if the wave function itself does not correspond
to anything physical in reality and is merely understood in instrumentalist terms, then the
instantaneous collapses could be made reconcilable with Relativity Theory, preserving equivalence
across all inertial reference frames. However, the evidence of theories and future physics whose
implications contradict the eternalist implications of SR and GR gives substantial hope to the
presentist. Moreover, given our understanding that GR has its limitations and is not a final theory,
alongside evidence from the History of Science, this argument seems enough to save presentism
from untenability. 
Discussion: Review of efforts to rescue Presentism
To conclude, let the arguments presented be reviewed and their relative merits to rescue 
presentism be assessed. The arguments from General Relativity and Cosmology present us with 
possible evidence for a preferred reference frame and consequently an absolute time through 
cosmological analysis; such as the analysis of Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation and the 
geometry of certain spacetime metrics. However, this evidence is not yet beyond the level of 
speculation and ultimately SR remains a limiting case theory of GR Thereby, if presentism is 
violated in local systems by SR it remains to be a problem for the presentist universally as all 
systems in GR reduce to locally flat Minkowski space in which SR holds. Moreover there is 
evidence for the spacetime view being further entrenched in GR. To conclude, it does not seem the 
argument from General Relativity is enough to save the presentist.
Secondly, the NeoLorentzian approach states that presentism can be reconciled with Special 
Relativity if a 3+1 dimensional ontology is accepted, instead of 4 dimensions, alongside the 
existence of an undetectable metaphysically privileged frame. It could be said that the NL 
interpretation adds less ontological structure to reality and hence should be preferred on the 
grounds of Occam’s razor however the interpretation has many downfalls. The justification for the 
choice of a metaphysically preferred frame is not given and remains substantially ad-hoc, whilst its 
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undetectability leads to severe criticism over the consequential lack of falsifiability of the theory, a 
criterion often deemed necessary for a successful scientific theory. Furthermore, the theory lacks 
the ability to coherently explain the physical phenomenon of the symmetry of length contractions 
and time dilations as postulated by SR. If events at rest with respect to a metaphysically preferred 
frame equally undergo contractions from the point of view of an inertially moving reference frame 
then what is the role or significance of the preferred frame at all and what hope could the presentist 
possibly draw from it’s existence? To conclude the NeoLorentzian interpretation seems to provide 
no rescue for the presentist when compared to the Minkowski interpretation which seems a much 
more natural exposition of the theory itself.
Thirdly, we review the anti-realist regarding the nature of time. The anti-realist argues that 
although our measurements of time, in accordance with the postulates of the theory, suggest the 
nature of time is relative in reality this should not mean it is so in reality. The anti-realist may argue 
in instrumentalist terms that spacetime and four-dimensional geometry are excellent tools for 
helping us probe the phenomenon and drawing predictions but this should not mean these entities 
exist in reality or are a direct reflection on the nature of reality. Secondly, why should we presume 
our measurements have a grip on the workings of reality or that our successful theories reflect an 
approximate ‘truth’ - as such a connection cannot be proved necessary. The reply to these 
criticisms are merely the standard arguments of the realist; SR and GR are our best theories of 
time and thus we should take their findings and implications seriously, else we make the success 
of science an apparent miracle. The realist, anti-realist debate has been an a central debate in the 
history of philosophy of science for centuries, so to draw on one side of this argument (which 
cannot be said to have ever clearly defeated the other) is not sufficient to rescue the present - it 
becomes a matter of philosophical inclination.
 Fourthly, there is the argument for an alternative form of presentism in the context of Relativity 
Theory. Taking the Minkowski interpretation of the theory and its assumptions we reach the 
conclusion of the Block Universe. Such a construct requires the doctrine of the presentist in the 
relativistic framework to be that of the ‘relativised present’ whereby all the events that are viewed 
as real by an observer as those that are regarded to be simultaneous with him in his rest frame. 
Stein presents an alternate form of presentism in the context of relativity known as ‘point 
presentism’. This doctrine restores a form of temporal becoming in the framework of SR and thus 
postulates substantially more than the eternalist and his Block Universe. However in reducing the 
present to a ‘here-now’, the position drastically detracts from the ‘full-bloodedness’ of presentism 
as much of the meaning of the traditional present is lost. There is no longer a cosmic ‘now’ or 
universal present moment distinguishing between a fixed past and open future. The ‘here-now’ 
present moment can be criticised in its reduction to resembling solipsism. Therefore, although 
perhaps the closest so far in restoring some sense of temporal passage, this argument is not a 
sufficient rescue for the presentist.
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Finally, we examine the argument from the advancement of scientific theories and the 
possibility of a future unified theory taking the form of probabilistic quantum gravity. As seen from 
the history of science, theories are repeatedly replaced by successor theories which most often 
retain their predecessors as limiting cases whilst increasing their predictive powers to wider 
subsystems of nature. As Newtonian Mechanics and SR were ultimately proved to be false by their 
successor theories so likely too will GR. In fact it is already evident that GR is not a final theory due 
to its inherent incompatibilities with the Quantum domain. QM possesses several phenomenon 
which could be described probabilistically, such as instantaneous wave packet collapse and if such 
phenomenon were verified they could provide evidence for a rest frame and cosmic wide now. 
However, probabilistic interpretations and the nature of their corresponding phenomenon are still 
extremely speculative. If QM could provide evidence that the laws of nature were fundamentally 
probabilistic and a unifying theory took the form of probabilistic quantum gravity, eternalism could 
be said to be refuted and presentism would triumph. Such theories remain very hypothetical but 
the hope (and the unknown) of future physics provides us good enough reason to believe that 
presentism should not be untenable given relativity theory. Until we achieve a unified theory, from 
which we can confidently judge the nature of time, the four-dimensional view may remain viable 
however one day the three-dimensional view may become equally as so. Science and our 
understanding of the universe undergoes continual progression and as such we would do 
ourselves an injustice to rule out theories, such as presentism, from our unfinished standpoint. 
Conclusions: Time and scientific enquiry
Recapping initial thoughts, the pervasive passage of time, with an open future and decided 
past, is a fundamental part of our human experience. It is from such a pervasive passage we are 
able to construct a framework to better understand and characterise reality and the ontological 
openness of the future is what grants us our free will. To do away with this presentist idea of time 
would severely undermine our perception of the world and place in it. 
When interpreting the meaning of scientific theories we must take care that we consider the 
nature of the disciplines involved. An interdisciplinarity synthesis is extremely important when 
physical or mathematical theories seek to draw ontological conclusions as the level of our empirical 
enquiry are severely limited when compared to the vast scales of the cosmos. Moreover, as history 
has shown physical theories are progressively replaced by those more and more advanced and 
philosophy must continue to act as a check that we are not over-interpreting our findings when we 
use the success of our theories to postulate truths about the nature of reality. 
Philosophy strives for a clarity, an attention to conceptual weak points in theories that is 
sometimes lost in the calculations of the physically inclined. For Physics to be able to advance and 
marry theories that seem presently incompatible, i.e. GR and QM, in order to arrive at a theory 
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which will bring us closer to understanding the nature of time in our universe, we require 
philosophy to seek the conceptual incompatibilities between the physical theories to guide us. It is 
precisely this synthesis of thought that led Einstein, when reconciling the apparent incompatibilities 
between the principle of relativity and law of the propagation of light to arrive at his Theory of 
Relativity in the first place. 
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